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Why the ACUM-PSRM coalition 
collapsed
The direct cause of the collapse of the Sandu gov-
ernment was the conflict between the coalition 
members over the position of the Prosecutor Gen-
eral. On 6 November Olesea Stamate, the Minister 
of Justice nominated by ACUM (this bloc is com-
posed of the Party of Action and Solidarity [PAS] 
and the Dignity and Truth Platform Party [DA]) 
invalidated the results of a weeks-long competi-
tion aimed at selecting candidates for the position 
of Prosecutor General.1 In justifying her decision 
Stamate argued that one of the members of the 
commission had given too low or too high grades 
to the candidates, which influenced the final re-
sult of the selection procedure. It quickly turned 
out that the person in question was Petru Bobu, 
a lawyer assigned to the commission by PSRM. 
He had given lower grades to the independent 
1 The Prosecutor General from the list provided by the com-
mission was to be eventually selected by the Supreme 
Council of Prosecutors. 
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candidates from civil society, Ştefan Gligorov and 
Vlad Gribincea, compared to those given by the 
other members of the commission.
Sandu’s government interpreted these actions 
as an attempt to exert political influence on the 
selection process, and to prevent blocking the can-
didates that were not supported by PSRM. Thus, 
also on 6 November, the government amended the 
law on the prosecutor’s office. The amendment 
eliminated the competition procedure and gave 
the prime minister the right to present candidates 
to the Supreme Council of Prosecutors. The change 
in regulations was introduced by the method of 
‘the government’s assumption of responsibility 
for the law’, a characteristic procedure for the 
Moldovan legal order. A document passed within 
the framework of such procedure does not re-
quire a parliamentary majority, and it can be only 
blocked by a vote of no confidence in the gov-
ernment. PSRM and President Dodon refuted the 
accusations made by ACUM representatives, and 
fiercely criticised both the government’s amend-
ment and the way in which it was passed. They 
also called for the coalition partner to withdraw 
from the proposed changes and to discuss them 
in parliament. Sandu continued to refuse to make 
any concessions. As a result, on 8 November PSRM 
filed a motion on a vote of no confidence in her 
government.
From the perspective of the ACUM bloc, the ap-
pointment of a Prosecutor General is a key element 
in the de-politicisation and de-oligarchisation of 
the state apparatus. Control over the prosecutor 
and courts were the foundations of the rule of 
Vlad Plahotniuc, the billionaire and oligarch who 
had effectively ruled Moldova from late 2015 until 
June 2019.2 It was also important for ACUM’s 
image to maintain a very decisive position in this 
regard. From the very beginning, repairing the 
corrupt legal system and returning its independ-
ence to it were elements of this political bloc’s 
agenda and the basis of its popularity. However, 
2 K. Całus, ‘Moldova: from oligarchic pluralism to Plahotniuc’s 
hegemony’, OSW Commentary, no. 208, 7 April 2016, 
www.osw.waw.pl.
the high representatives of PSRM could not allow 
someone fully independent to become Prosecutor 
General as this would threaten their political and 
financial interests, and even the personal freedom 
of its senior figures. It seems certain that some 
PSRM members have been involved in different 
scandals in recent years. The Socialists co-operated 
closely, although unofficially, with the Democratic 
Party of Moldova (which at that time was led 
by Plahotniuc) and worked with its politicians, 
who had probably participated in numerous cor-
ruption schemes (likely including the theft of US$1 
billion from Moldovan banks in 2014). The PSRM’s 
finances are not transparent, and in some areas 
have very unclear origins (investigative journalists, 
for example, have suggested that the money may 
have come from tax havens).3 The Socialists are 
also accused of receiving regular financial support 
from the Kremlin. One of the key pieces of evi-
dence supporting this assumption is a recording 
that was revealed by the Moldovan media in June 
2019 in which Dodon admitted that the PSRM was 
receiving US$1 million per month from Russia.4 
Ever since they formed the government together 
with ACUM (June 2019), the Socialists have been 
doing everything they can to take control over the 
judiciary, fearing criminal liability and the loss of 
their positions. 
The political scene’s new shape
Only six days after the collapse of the ACUM-PSRM 
coalition, the Socialists, with the support of the 
Democratic Party of Moldova, established a new 
minority government with Ion Chicu as prime 
minister. The swiftness with which the new gov-
ernment was established indicates that negoti-
ations in this regards had started long before 
the crisis over the Prosecutor General. Just like 
the Socialists, the Democrats too, who feared 
being held accountable for the time they were 
in power, wanted to have Prime Minister Sandu 
3 I. Sanduța, ‘Banii lui Dodon din Bahamas’, RISE Moldova, 
28 September 2016, www.rise.md. O. Ceaglei, ‘Afaceri 
offshore la sediul socialiștilor’, RISE Moldova, 22 September 
2016, www.rise.md.
4 ‘PROBĂ VIDEO 3: Igor Dodon spune câți bani primea, lunar, 
din Rusia, pentru PSRM: 600-700 de mii de dolari, până la 
un milion’, Publika.md, 8 June 2019, www.publika.md.
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removed from power and to block the reform 
of the judiciary system, which ACUM had been 
pushing. By deciding to support the Socialists, they 
were probably counting on getting some level of 
influence on the government’s policies. Without 
their votes, PSRM will not have the parliamentary 
majority that it needs to pass legislation.
Chicu, while formally unaffiliated with any party, 
has worked with both with the Socialists and the 
Democratic Party of Moldova. During the period of 
the PDM government (until June 2019) he worked 
at the Ministry of Finance (first as the secretary 
general and later as the minister). Among oth-
er things, he was responsible for implementing 
a controversial law allowing the so-called amnes-
ty of capital. These new regulations were likely 
meant to allow the legalisation of shady financial 
resources managed by the members of the state 
apparatus and businessmen, as well as politicians 
from outside Moldova. Chicu’s candidature as 
a compromise prime minister of the PSRM-PDM 
coalition government was reportedly considered 
by Vlad Plahotniuc after the parliamentary elec-
tions in February 2019. From June 2019 until he 
became prime minister, Chicu was an advisor 
to President Dodon. The new government also 
included other former advisers to Dodon and 
Zinaida Greceanîi, the speaker of parliament and 
head of the PSRM (they took over the portfolios 
of justice, foreign affairs, defence, education, 
health and agriculture).
Since the establishment of the new government, 
President Dodon now controls most of the power 
in the country. He has direct influence over the 
government and control over numerous key state 
institutions. During the time of the ACUM-PSRM 
coalition he succeeded in gaining control over 
the Constitutional Court (in August 2019 Vladmir 
Turcan, an MP from the PSRM, became its chair-
man), the National Anti-Corruption Centre (since 
July 2019 it has been headed by Ruslan Flocea, 
the secretary of the president’s office) as well as 
the Security and Information Services (SIS).5 It 
appears that the process of neutralising the office 
of the Prosecutor General, which is a threat to Do-
don’s power structure, is now underway. Since 
December 2019 it has been headed by Alexandr 
Stoianoglo; although he himself enjoys a good 
reputation, there are serious concerns regarding 
the independence and integrity of the people 
who were selected as his deputies.6 These include 
Mircea Roşioru, who was the deputy to Eduard 
Harunjen (connected to Plahotniuc), and Ruslan 
Popov, who is accused of corruption.7 Undoubtedly 
the secret services, which are subordinate to the 
president, are attempting to block the transfer of 
material evidence to the Prosecutor which could 
in any way hurt the interests of the Socialists and 
the politicians who co-operate with them. 
Consequences of the PSRM’s takeover 
of power 
The PSRM’s takeover of power, which has been 
temporarily supported by the PDM, indicates that 
there will be a halt to the ambitious reform agenda 
initiated by Sandu’s government. Both the PSRM 
and President Dodon want to recreate the system 
of control over state institutions, including the 
judicial system and the media, which was created 
by Vlad Plahotniuc in recent years. This is impor-
tant to the Socialists not only because they would 
be willing to block some corruption cases which 
involve PSRM members, but also to reinforce 
their political positions and get the opportunity 
to benefit financially from access to the state 
apparatus and public money. 
It can be expected that the new government will 
imitate structural reforms in order to keep at least 
5 S. Mihailovici, ‘ULTIMA ORĂ // Ruslan Flocea, desemnat 
pentru funcția de șef al CNA’, TV8, 29 July 2019, 
www.tv8.md.
6 ‘Тулбуре об Александре Стояногло: Впервые генпро-
курор вызывает доверие’, Gagauzinfo.md, 20 December 
2019, www.gagauzinfo.md. 
7 ‘Дом свекрови, угодья отца и роскошная жизнь про-
курора Чекан’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 4 January 2018, 
www.kp.md. 
The new government will imitate 
structural reforms in order to retain 
some of the financial support that 
Moldova has received from the West 
under Sandu’s government.
OSW Commentary     NUMBER 321 4
some of the financial support which Moldova re-
ceived from the West under Sandu’s government. 
Continued external support is very important 
for the state budget’s stability. Thus, the plans 
presented by Chicu’s government for the years 
2020-2 show that Moldova will receive around 
€1 billion from abroad: 71% of this money will 
come from the World Bank, the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development and the 
European Investment Bank, while only 14% will 
come from Russia.8 EU states are also responsible 
for over 80% of all investment in the Moldovan 
economy and around 65% of exports.
The collapse of Sandu’s government and the So-
cialists’ takeover of power weakened Moldova’s 
relations with the EU. This process will likely contin-
ue, despite calls by the government and President 
Dodon for good relations with both the country’s 
Western partners and Russia to be maintained. 
In the first decade of this century the Communist 
Party of Moldova (PCRM) under President Vladimir 
Voronin had a similar policy of balancing between 
Moscow and the West. Apart from the purely 
financial aspect (i.e. receiving money from the 
West), Moldova needs to maintain this balance in 
international relations to preserve a good image. 
The Moldovan public is tired of the geopolitical 
discourse which dominates Moldova’s politics, 
and expects a conciliatory foreign policy which is 
based on co-operation with all of the country’s key 
partners. President Dodon, who plans to run for 
re-election in November 2020, will probably try 
to meet the voters’ expectations. However, there 
is no doubt that it will be very difficult to build 
a positive image of the new government among 
its Western partners. This is illustrated by President 
Dodon’s statement on 14 February 2020, in which 
he accused several EU ambassadors to Moldova 
8 ‘Cine vor fi sponsorii principali ai Guvernului în următorii 
trei ani’, Mold-Street, 12 December 2019, www.mold-
street.com.
(without providing their names) of blocking dia-
logue between the new authorities and the EU, 
and of providing the European capitals with dis-
information on the real situation in the country.9 
Moreover, despite declaring a multi-vector foreign 
policy, the Socialists are treating relations with 
Moscow as a priority. This was evident during 
Chicu’s first foreign visit, which he made to Mos-
cow. As a gesture to build positive relations with 
the Moldovan government, Russia promised 
to offer it a preferential loan (with an interest 
rate of less than 2%) of US$500 million.10 Accord-
ing to Prime Minister Chicu, the first transfer (of 
US$200 million) could reach Moldova by the end 
of March 2020.11 There is no doubt that the So-
cialists’ rise to power will lead to greater political 
and business influence for Russia in Moldova. 
Back at the end of 2019 Igor Chaika, the son of 
the former prosecutor general of the Russian 
Federation Yuri Chaika, took over a controlling 
share package in Media Invest Service, a company 
which controls one of the TV channels that had 
hitherto belonged to PSRM.12 Earlier, in September 
2019, Dodon suggested that Russian firms may be 
interested in investing in the Moldovan sea port 
at Giurgiulești.13
Dodon’s uncertain future 
Despite Dodon’s unquestioned success in form-
ing the Chicu government, and by extension 
his effective takeover of power, the president’s 
position in Moldova’s politics remains uncertain. 
The key challenge comes from the presidential 
9 ‘Igor Dodon, mesaj dur către ambasadori UE: „Unii 
dintre voi mi se pare că sunteți membri ai PAS cu DA, nu 
dezinformați Bruxelles-ul”’, Unimedia, 14 February 2020, 
www.unimedia.info. 
10 ‘Россия готова выделить Молдове кредит на 500 млн 
долларов для реализации инфраструктурных проектов 
в нашей стране’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 25 November 
2019, www.kp.md.
11 ‘De la 500 de milioane de dolari – la 200 de milioane. Chicu 
a explicat în ce condiții se negociează creditul cu Rusia și 
câți ani va avea Moldova la dispoziție pentru a plăti datoria’, 
Agora, 26 February 2020, www.agora.md.
12 Н. Пахольницкий, ‘Игорь Чайка стал совладельцем «Пер-
вого в Молдове» и Accent TV’, NewsMaker, 29 December 
2019, www.newsmaker.md.
13 В. Соловьев, ‘«Чтобы Владимир Путин прилетел, нужна 
четкая и какая-то прорывная повестка»’, Kommersant, 
23 September 2019, www.kommersant.ru.
Moldova’s relations with the EU have 
weakened, and this process will con-
tinue, despite Dodon’s calls for good 
relations with both the West and 
Russia.
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election planned for the end of 2020, in which 
Dodon will probably compete against Maia San-
du, the former Prime Minister and the leader of 
the Party of Action and Solidarity. Dodon and 
Sandu have similar popularity ratings; in the 2016 
elections Dodon beat Sandu by just over 4 per-
centage points (52.1% as compared to 47.8%), 
while according to a poll conducted in December 
2019 both politicians received around 25% of 
support each.14 
Dodon’s main priority is to stay in power, or at 
least not to allow a candidate from the opposition 
to become president (this second priority is shared 
by the PDM). Consequently, it can be expected 
that both the president and the Socialists, as well 
as the media outlets connected to them, will or-
chestrate an intensive media campaign against 
the ACUM bloc, and against Sandu in particular. 
Similar activities might be undertaken by the 
now much weaker but still quite powerful media 
holding which belongs to Vlad Plahotniuc, who 
fled Moldova in June 2019.15
Given the uncertainty of the presidential elections, 
it is possible that Dodon will decide to bring back 
the system in which the president is elected by the 
parliament and not by popular vote. This model 
functioned in Moldova in the years 2000-16 (at 
that time the head of state was elected by a three-
fifths majority of all deputies), but in March 2016 
the Constitutional Court, which was controlled 
by Vlad Plahotniuc, ruled unconstitutional the 
14 A. Ceapai, ‘Sondaj: Igor Dodon și Maia Sandu, la egalitate 
în preferințele electoratului’, Radio Europa Liberă Moldova, 
5 December 2019, moldova.europalibera.org.
15 Because of the split which took place within the PDM in 
February 2020, it is not fully certain which position the 
above-mentioned media will take in the conflict between 
ACUM and the PSRM. Some sources indicate that Andrian 
Candu, who has left the Democratic Party of Moldova, now 
has a decisive influence on the holding’s information policy. 
Even though these media outlets will definitely not support 
ACUM, they may start a campaign against the Socialists.
amendment introducing indirect elections which 
had been passed in 2000. The judges’ decision was 
regarded as politically motivated and was widely 
criticised (including by the Venice Commission). It 
is possible that President Dodon, using his influ-
ence in the Constitutional Court, will be able to 
orchestrate a withdrawal from the 2016 decision, 
by drawing upon the opinion of the international 
institutions and justifying it with a will to “fix” 
the damage done to Moldova’s political system 
by Plahotniuc. At the moment Dodon has pub-
licly denied considering such a scenario, but the 
possibility is still open.16
Another problem for the Socialists is their lack of 
a stable parliamentary majority, forcing them to 
cooperate with the PDM, which holds no seats 
in the cabinet. Since its leader and sponsor Vlad 
Plahotniuc fled the country, this party is now in 
a deep crisis of policy, image and finances. These 
internal conflicts, which are a result of different 
visions for the PDM’s further development, are the 
reason why six deputies, led by Andrian Candu, 
the former speaker of parliament and a member 
of Plahotniuc’s family, left the party’s ranks on 
19 February 2020. In the immediate future the 
PDM may start to work more closely with the 
Socialists and some of its members will become 
ministers in Chicu’s cabinet, a scenario that Pres-
ident Dodon himself has not been excluded.17 
A possible PSRM-PDM coalition would certainly 
improve the stability of the current government.
Divisions within the opposition
The events of the last months have enforced San-
du’s image as an uncompromising and relentless 
idealist who is focused on judicial reform and the 
breakup of the corruption networks that are still 
present in Moldova. Despite all that, the ACUM 
bloc seems to be structurally much weaker today 
than it was before she became prime minister. 
16 А. Батанова, ‘«Мы не будем предлагать изменить 
Конституцию». Додон против избрания президента 
парламентом’, NewsMaker, 17 December 2019, www.
newsmaker.md.
17 О. Горчак, ‘«Нужна новая кровь». Додон о коалиции 
с Демпартией и перестановках в правительстве’, 
NewsMaker, 21 February 2020, www.newsmaker.md.
Despite Dodon’s success with form-
ing the Chicu government, and by 
extension taking over power, his po-
sition in Moldova’s politics remains 
uncertain.
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ACUM’s main problem is its increasing fragmen-
tation, which may even lead to its collapse. In 
recent months the conflict between the parties 
that make up the bloc has only deepened, as to 
a great extent they are competing for the same 
voters. One reason for the worsening divisions was 
the failure of Sandu’s rival, the leader of Dignity 
and Truth (DA) Andrei Năstase, to win the elections 
for mayor of Chișinău against the representative of 
the Socialists Ion Ceban in early November 2019. 
The tensions between both groups have also been 
exacerbated by the falling popularity of DA and 
Năstase himself, who has been accused of shady 
connections and personal corruption. According 
to an opinion poll published in December 2019, 
DA can only count on around 3.3% of votes, which 
would bring it below the electoral threshold for 
parliament.18 At the same time, only 16% of those 
surveyed believe that the DA leader should run 
in this year’s presidential elections (84% support 
Sandu’s candidacy).19
The divisions and conflicts among the bloc’s lead-
ers will be a serious problem in the oncoming 
elections.20 It seems unlikely that the pro-Western 
groups of ACUM will be able to agree on one 
candidate. This situation will lead to a dispersal 
of votes and lower Sandu’s final result. Regarding 
her candidacy, it is almost certain that the former 
18 ‘SONDAJ BOP: În caz de alegeri parlamentare, partidul lui 
Năstase NU ar trece pragul electoral. PSRM pe prima poziție’, 
Telegraph, 30 December 2019, www.telegraph.md.
19 ‘SONDAJ // Năstase detestat de 84% din respondenții 
unui sondaj. Oamenii NU vor ca acesta să candideze la 
prezidențiale’, Telegraph, 30 December 2019, www.tele-
graph.md.
20 In September 2019 one DA deputy, Octavian Țîcu, left the 
party and decided to run as an independent for mayor of 
Chișinău during the elections in October-November 2019. 
He did so despite the fact that his former bloc was sup-
porting the candidacy of the DA leader Andrei Năstase. In 
early January 2020 some members of the bloc started to 
publicly accuse their party colleagues of a lack of loyalty 
and of representing the interests of PSRM and Plahotniuc. 
prime minister will run for president, although 
no decision in this regards has yet been taken.21 
The right of Moldova’s political spectrum could 
also be destabilised by the unexpected release 
from prison on 3 December 2019 of Vlad Filat, the 
former prime minister and leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (PLDM).22 In June 2016 Filat was 
sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment for crimes 
including his involvement in the theft of US$1 
billion from Moldovan banks in 2014. The former 
prime minister is not a popular politician among 
the public, but his presence in the public sphere 
and his opportunity to make critical speeches 
could generate tensions and increase divisions 
among the pro-European groups. 
Prospects
The political system established in Moldova at the 
start of December 2019, and which is dominated 
by the current president and the Socialists he con-
trols, is inherently unstable. How long it continues 
will depend both on the PDM politicians’ support 
of Chicu’s government, and in the longer term on 
the results of this year’s presidential elections. 
However, there is no doubt that Dodon’s possible 
reelection will allow for a deeper consolidation 
of power for his political camp, and incline the 
Socialist to further subordinate the state’s appa-
ratus and state-owned businesses to themselves. 
Such activities, if accompanied by the expected 
lack of reforms and violations of the rule of law, 
will generate greater criticism of Moldova from its 
Western partners (especially from the EU). This, in 
turn, will push the Socialists towards ever closer 
co-operation with Russia. 
21 ‘Maia Sandu: Dacă nu discutăm, nu vom ajunge să avem 
un candidat comun la prezidențiale’, IPN, 31 January 2020, 
www.ipn.md.
22 S. Mihailovici, ‘OFICIAL! Vlad Filat a fost eliberat din 
penitenciar’, TV8, 3 December 2019, www.tv8.md.
The stability of the political system, 
controlled by the Socialists, will 
depend on the PDM’s support of 
Chicu’s government, and the result 
of this year’s presidential elections.
